Volume 71
Issue 2 Dickinson Law Review - Volume 71,
1966-1967
1-1-1967

Recent Cases

Follow this and additional works at: https://ideas.dickinsonlaw.psu.edu/dlra

Recommended Citation
Recent Cases, 71 DICK. L. REV. 366 (1967).
Available at: https://ideas.dickinsonlaw.psu.edu/dlra/vol71/iss2/12

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews at Dickinson Law IDEAS. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Dickinson Law Review by an authorized editor of Dickinson Law IDEAS. For more
information, please contact lja10@psu.edu.

RECENT CASES

CRIMINAL LAW-INFORMER'S PRIVILEGE
Commonwealth v. Carter,208 Pa. Super. 245, 222 A.2d 475 (1966).
Until the recent case of Commonwealth v. Carter,' the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania had elicted no rule or policy as to disclosure of the identity of an informer in a criminal prosecution.
In Carter the superior court announced that the Commonwealth
has the right to withhold the identity of an informer, and based
their decision primarily on the public policy requirement of aiding
law enforcement agencies in detecting crime. This Note will analyze the Carter ruling in light of recent state and federal decisions in this area of so-called "informer's privilege."
In October of 1965, the defendant, Melvin Carter, was met on a
street corner in Philadelphia by an undercover agent for the Philadelphia Police and an informer, under the surveillance of a federal
narcotics agent who observed from a distance. After refusing to
make a direct sale of narcotics to the undercover agent, Carter
sold three envelopes of narcotics to the informer, who, in defendant's presence, immediately gave the material to the agent. Carter
was subsequently indicted for felonious possession and sale of narcotic drugs.
At no time was the informer's name disclosed; nor did his
name appear as a witness on the indictment; nor was he called as a2
witness at trial. Because of this non-disclosure, Carter's counse
demurred at the close of the Commonwealth's case, claiming that
the prosecution failed to produce or disclose the identity of an eyewitness. The court below, in overruling the demurrer, held that
the Commonwealth need not identify the informer, and further
found that appellant knew the informer, so that he could have been
called, had defendant wished to do so.
Carter's defense at trial was not entrapment, but a complete
denial, to wit, mistaken identity; that he was not at the scene;
and that he never dealt in narcotics. The accused was positively
identified at the trial by the two law enforcement officers.
On appeal, the superior court affirmed the lower court's refusal to require the prosecution to produce or disclose the identity
of the informer. As a result of this determination, defendant's
1. 208 Pa. Super. 245, 222 A.2d 475 (1966).

2. Carter appeared in forma pauperis. Counsel was provided by Defender Association of Philadelphia.
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sentence of five to ten years for felonious possession and sale of
drugs was affirmed, but not without vigorous dissent.
The court realized that the application of the government's
privilege of non-disclosure depends on the particular circumstances
of the individual case, citing the leading case on informer's privilege, Roviaro v. United States.3 Thus, upon balancing of public
interest in protecting the flow of information against the individual's right to prepare his defense, 4 the court held that the appellant's right, under these circumstances, must give way.
The superior court, in setting a precedent for Pennsylvania,
appears to rub against the grain of Roviaro 5 and other recent decisions" in this area, which have held that, under the facts of their
cases, failure of the lower court to require disclosure of the identity
of an informer is reversible error. In those cases, the informer
was considered a material witness on the issue of guilt or innocence
of the accused, and for the purpose of fair trial, the informer's
identity had to be revealed.
In Roviaro, the accused was convicted in federal district court
on two counts of violation of federal narcotics laws. At trial, two
federal narcotics agents and two Chicago police officers testified
for the prosecution, which revealed that in August of 1954, an informer (referred to only as "John Doe"), after being searched
for narcotics, 7 met Albert Roviaro, the accused, in a parked car on

a street corner in Chicago; that the alleged sale took place between
Roviaro and the informer in Doe's car; that one police officer hid
in the trunk of said car, overhearing the conversation between Doe
and Roviaro; that the other law enforcement officers observed the
transaction from a distance. Roviaro's defense was a complete
denial.
Roviaro's counsel, before and during trial, attempted without
success, to obtain the identity of the informer. The court of
3. 353 U.S. 53 (1957).
4. Id. at 62: ". . . taking into consideration the crime charged, the

possible defenses, the possible significance of informer's testimony, and
other relevant factors."
5. Supra note 3.
6. Gilmore v. United States, 256 F.2d 565 (5th Cir. 1955); Portomene
v. United States, 221 F.2d 582 (5th Cir. 1955); United States v. Conforti,
200 F.2d 365 (7th Cir. 1953); Sorrentino v. United States, 163 F.2d 627
(9th Cir. 1947); People v. Durazo, 52 Cal.2d 354, 340 P.2d 594 (1959);
People v. Williams, 51 Cal.2d 355, 333 P.2d 19 (1959); People v. McShann,
50 Cal.2d 802, 330 P.2d 33 (1958); People v. Diaz, 174 Cal. App. 2d 799, 345
P.2d 370 (1959); People v. Castiel, 153 Cal. App. 2d 653, 315 P.2d 79 (1957);
State v. Oliver, 92 N.J. Super. 228, 222 A.2d 761 (1966).
7. The usual pattern in narcotics cases of this nature is as follows:
An informer, employed by the government, is searched by narcotics agents
to determine that the informer himself is carrying no narcotics. He is then
given money (usually marked) and told to make a purchase of drugs. The
agents then follow the informer and observe the transaction between the
defendant and informer. The informer then turns the incriminating packets over to the agents for analysis.
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appeals sustained the conviction, 8 and certiorari was granted by.
the United States Supreme Court 9 to pass on the propriety of nondisclosure and to consider a conflict with other federal cases in
this area.10
The Supreme Court reversed Roviaro's conviction on the basis
that fundamental fairness to the defendant limits the government's privilege of non-disclosure.? The Court stated:
Where the disclosure of an informer's identity, or the contents of his communication, is relevant and helpful to the
defense of an accused, or is essential to a 12fair determination of a cause, the privilege must give way.
Thus, the Roviaro Court felt that "the only person, other
than petitioner himself, who could, controvert, explain or amplify""3 the prosecution's testimony was the informer, John Doe.
The Pennsylvania Superior Court distinguishes between the Roviaro and Carter facts on the basis that in Roviaro, the informer
was a sole participant (ergo, his testimony would be relevant) and
in Carter, there were others present (ergo, his testimony would
not be relevant). The Carterdissent takes issue with this interpretation of Roviaro, and points out that Roviaro is concerned primarily with the materiality of a witness on the issue of a defendant's guilt, 14 as later cases have shown,' 5 and not primarily
whether the informer was a participant, non-participant, sole participant or otherwise.
8. United States v. Roviaro, 229 F.2d 812 (7th Cir. 1956).
9. Roviaro v. United States,.351 U.S. 936 (1956).
10. Portomene v. United States, 221 F.2d 582 (5th Cir. 1955). (Ac
cused denied sales of narcotics to informer, thought informer had grudge.
Court held nondisclosure was prejudicial to defense of accused); United
States v. Conforti, 200 F.2d 365 (7th Cir. 1953) (Accused convicted of possession of counterfeit notes through alleged sale to informer. Court affirmed conviction, but intimated that accused would have been entitled
to disclosure of identity of informer if proper demand was made at trial);
Sorrentino v. United States, 163 F.2d 627 (9th Cir. 1947) (disclosure would
have been ordered, had not the informer's identity been disclosed during
trial by testimony of another government witness).
11. There are certain basic limitations to the government's privilege
of nondisclosure: (1) If disclosure of contents of informer's communication
would not reveal the identity of the informer, the contents are not privileged; (2) If identity of the informer has already been disclosed, or is
admitted, or known, then the privilege of secrecy is superfluous; (3) If
disclosure appears necessary to avoid risk of false testimony, or in order
to secure useful testimony and fair determination of the issues, the identity
will be compelled. The cases under discussion fall into this third category.
See 353 U.S. at 60-61; 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2374 (McNaughten Rev. 1961)
at 765-769; MODEL CODE Or EVIDENCE, rule 230 (1942).
12. 353 U.S. at 60-61.
13. Id. at 64.
14. 208 Pa. Super. at 252, 222 A.2d at 479.
15. See state cases cited note 6 supra. See also Annot., 76 A.L.R.2d
257 (1959).
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State decisions were quick to embrace Roviaro and to emphasize the need for disclosure based on materiality, not participation.
For example, in a leading California case, People v. McShann,16
the defendant's conviction for possession and sale of narcotics was
reversed when it appeared that an informer, whose identity was
not revealed in the lower court, set up the alleged transactions by
telephone, and then participated in an alleged purchase. For the
court, Justice Traynor stated:
Disclosure is not limited to the informer who participates
in the crime alleged. The information elicited from an
informer may be 'relevant and helpful

. . .

or essential ...'

even though the informer was not a participant. For example, the testimony of an eyewitness-non-participant informer that would vindicate the innocence of the accused
or lessen the risk of false testimony would obviously be
relevant and helpful.
* * * Thus, when it appears from the evidence that the in-

former is a material witness on the issue of guilt and the
accused seeks disclosure on cross-examination, the17 people
must either disclose his identity or incur a dismissal.
Again, in People v. Durazo,'8 the California Supreme Court
required disclosure of the identity of an informer although the
informer had only participated in the first of three alleged sales
for which the defendant was being prosecuted.' 9 The court reasoned that if the informer had contradicted the police officer's
identification of the defendant with respect to the first sale in
which the informer was a direct participant, his testimony "would
have been highly significant to discredit the identification" 20 with
respect to alleged direct sales between defendant and police officers
during the days that followed.
In People v. Castiel,21 disclosure of an informer was necessary
when it was found that the informer had made telephone arrangements for two sales of narcotics, at different times during the same
day, and participated as purchaser in both. The testimony of the
officers who observed the transactions was denied by the defense.
The court stated:
It is the deprival of the defendants 22 of the opportunity
of producing evidence which might result in their ex16.
17.
18.
19.

50 Cal.2d 802, 330 P.2d 33 (1958).
Id. at 808, 330 P.2d at 36.
52 Cal.2d 354, 340 P.2d 594 (1959).
Informer participated alone in the alleged first sale, for which

defendant was acquitted without informer's identity revealed.

20. 52 Cal.2d at 356, 340 P.2d at 596.
21. 153 Cal. App. 2d 653, 315 P.2d 79 (1957).
22. Testimony revealed that the informer spoke by telephone to defendant Castiel to arrange for first sale, and then later that day contacted
by telephone another person, joined as defendant, to arrange for a second
sale between defendant Castiel and informer. It appears that both telephone calls were made to the home of the joined defendant.
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oneration which constitutes error in this case, and we
cannot assume because the prosecution evidence may seem
strong that the undisclosed evidence might not2 prove sufficient to overcome it in the minds of the jurors.
In a recent New Jersey case, State v. Oliver,2 4 disclosure of
the informer's identity was again deemed essential, as he was an
eyewitness, though not a participant, at three of the four alleged
incidents of defendant's bookmaking activity. The court in explaining its position, there stated:
[T] he rationale . . .is not that disclosure is based on
the fact of participation, etc., per se, but rather on the
circumstance that the informer's relationship to the alleged criminatory events has rendered him a material witness on the issue of defendant's guilt.25
In Carter, however, the Pennsylvania Superior Court held that
the facts did not require disclosure of the informer, that the decision as to disclosure rests with the discretion of the court, and that
the court had not abused its discretion. 2 In so deciding, the court
seems to have side-stepped the all-important issue of materiality
of the informer's identity to the fair trial of the accused. Since
Carter's defense was a complete denial, the credibility of the police
officers' testimony was brought into question. The informer, being
an eyewitness-participant to the alleged sale, would necessarily
have been in a position to "controvert, explain, or amplify" 27 the
testimony of the law enforcement officers; and the mere availability of these two eyewitnesses should not have affected the materiality of the informer's possible testimony in any way.
Thus, the Carter decision, in effect, says, that the Commonwealth, in its prosecution of an alleged illegal sale of narcotics,
need not produce nor identify an informer who, in the presence of
law enforcement officers, made the incriminating purchase, even
though the informer's testimony might be relevant and helpful to a
fair trial for the accused.
Also, the Carter court, in citing reasons for its decision, stated
that the accused knew the informer, and since he could have been
called, but defendant failed to do so, his identity was not necessary to preparation of the defense. 28 However, this forecloses the
very fact in issue, in light of defendant's complete denial, for it
infers that defendant was at the scene, and that therefore he would
know with whom he had made the alleged illegal sale. 29 The
23. 153 Cal. App. 2d at 659, 315 P.2d at 82.
24. 92 N.J. Super. 228, 222 A.2d 761 (1966).
25. Id. at 238, 222 A.2d at 766.
26. 208 Pa. Super. at 251, 222 A.2d at 478.
27. Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 64 (1957).
28. 208 Pa. Super. at 251, 222 A.2d at 478.
29. Id. at 254, 222 A.2d at 480. Cf., DeLosa v. Superior Court, 166
Cal. App. 2d 1, 332 P.2d 390 (1958), where the court rejected prosecution's
contention that defendant support his denial of knowledge of the identity
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logic of court's supposition here is questionable.
At common law,80 communications to the government by informers have been deemed to be protected by a privilege based on
public interest in detection of crime through a free flow of information.3 1 Behind the lofty ideal that it is in the public interest
for each person to report information regarding crime, is a practical
incentive in the form of a privilege of non-disclosure by which the
government can protect the individual, and without which, an informer would not come forth freely with his information, for fear
of retribution.3 2. The privilege is created to protect the informer, and thereby ultimately designed to protect the public."'
However, upon this privilege have been engrafted certain limitations, 4 the most important of which is an elemental fairness to
the accused. A prime example of this limitation has been in the
area where a person, as in Carter, becomes in reality more than a
mere informer, that is, where not only does he transmit information upon which police officers can begin to gather evidence, but
plays some active role in the transaction or event for which the
defendant is accused. When this occurs, the materiality of such
person must be considered, and the "fundamental fairness" limitation to the
privilege of non-disclosure becomes of paramount im8
portance. 5
Recent cases in this area illustrate situations in which an informer must be revealed. Thus, if identity or production of an
of the confidential agent. The court felt that evidence must clearly show
that the defendant does know the informer's identity; then, error in refusing disclosure might not be prejudicial. Also, in People v. McShann, 50
Cal. 2d 802, 330 P.2d 33 (1958), evidence introduced by the prosecution
that defendant had received two telephone calls from the informer and
that he made a sale of narcotics to the informer was not enough to establish that defendant knew informer since he denied receiving such calls, and
denied making such a sale.
30. See, for example In re Quarles and Butler, 158 U.S. 532, 535-36
(1895).
31. See generally, 8 WIGMORE, EvDENcE § 2374 (McNaughten Rev.
1961).
32. See, e.g., Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307 (1959), (informer
"died" four days after arrest of defendant); Brown v. United States, 222
F.2d 293 (9th Cir. 1955) (informer met violent death); Shuster v. City of
New York, 5 N.Y.2d 75, 180 N.Y.S.2d 265, 154 N.E.2d 534 (1958) (informer
murdered after bank robber apprehended).
33. See generally, Annot., 1 L.ed. 2d 1998.
34. See supra note 11.
35. For an interesting analysis of who comprises the class of persons
courts refer to as informers, see Comment, 63 YALE LAW Journal 206 (1954).
From a questionnaire distributed in 1953 by the Yale Law Journal to 31
Police Departments in cities of 25,000 or more, it was found that the most
:prolific source of informers are ordinary citizens. Next are persons who
have participated in crime and have turned against their partners. Occasionally, they are "plants" employed by law enforcement agencies to participate in crime, or are those who seek evidence of a crime with approval
or upon urging of governmental authorities.
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informer is relevant and helpful; 6 can amplify, explain or contradict; 7 can vindicate the accused;3 8 lessen the risk of false testimony; 39 sow the seeds of innocence, or of substantial doubt, or of
overwhelming corroboration; 40 might produce evidence which will
result in exoneration of the accused; 41 or is highly significant to
discredit identification, 42 then the prosecution cannot in all fairness to the accused refuse to reveal the informer's identity. 48 This
is the concept behind the disclosure of an informer's identity and
the trend today. The perspective taken by the courts has been,
as it should be, an analysis of facts through the eyes of one standing trial, as to his ability to prepare an adequate defense. Therefore, if there is a possibility that the accused does not have such
requisite ability, the government's privilege of non-disclosure of the
identity of an informer must fall. 44 Yet the Carter court has, in
effect, ruled otherwise.
It is conceivable that the police may be hampered, especially
in enforcement of narcotics laws, by losing a future source of information when disclosure of an informer's identity is deemed
necessary. 45 It is also well known that informers when identified
may be exposed to extreme danger. 46 It is laudable to look prospectively toward the protection of the general public by aiding in the
detection and prosecution of crime.
However, it should be the aim of every court to strike a
balance between protection of a free flow of information and the
right of an accused to a proper defense; therefore, it is submitted
that a realistic balance upon the facts of Carter should not have
merited such a result on the defendant, so as to deprive him of
36. Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 60-61 (1957).
37. Id. at 64.
38. People v. McShann, 50 Cal.2d 802, 808, 330 P.2d 33, 36 (1958).
39. Id.
40. Gilmore v. United States, 256 F.2d 565, 567 (5th Cir. 1955).
41. People v. Castiel, 153 Cal. App. 2d 653, 659, 315 P.2d 79, 82 (1957).
42. People v. Durazo, 52 Cal.2d 354, 356, 340 P.2d 594, 596 (1959).
43. State v. Oliver, 92 N.J. Super. 228, 236, 222 A.2d 761, 765 (1966).
44. Id. at 42, 222 A.2d at 768.
45. See People v. Durazo, 52 Cal.2d 354, 358, 340 P.2d 594, 597 (1958)
(dissent):
We are advised by the attorney general that prior to the recent
restrictive decision of this court in favor of the defendants relating
to the disclosure of informer's names, the great majority of narcotics arrests resulted from the use of informers for the purpose of
initiating, developing or substantiating the investigation. But since
those decisions the use of informers has been almost eliminated
and law enforcement in this area has become comparatively ineffective.
46. See supra, note 32. Query whether a person may inform through
personal inward motivation for example, of revenge, hate, or prospect of
lessened sentence, without knowledge of the informer's privilege, and regardless of the possible revelation of his identity or possible dangerous
consequences therefrom, therefore putting aside the "fear of retribution"
theory which is a pillar of the privilege of nondisclosure,
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an informer-eyewitness-participant in the alleged illegal act for
which he must stand trial.
The basic tenet of our system of criminal justice should still
prevail, that the accused is innocent until proven guilty by a jury
of his peers beyond a reasonable doubt, and that one so accused, of
necessity, must be given an adequate opportunity to prepare his
defense. That need must not be cast aside.
ERIc D. GERST

EVIDENCE-EXCLUSIONARY RULE-DOES MAPP v.
OHIO APPLY TO EVIDENCE OBTAINED BY
PRIVATE PERSONS IN A DIVORCE CASE
Del Presto -v. Del Presto, 92 N.J. Super. 305, 223 A.2d 217 (1966).
The New Jersey Superior Court, Chancery Division, in Del
Presto v. Del Presto' has held evidence secured by illegal forcible
entry into the correspondent's home by the plaintiff and private
investigators to be inadmissible in a divorce action. The decision
was rendered upon a motion to suppress evidence.2 In so ruling,
the New Jersey court has reached a result opposite to a similar
New York case.3 Both cases were decided upon constitutional
grounds and required determination of the effect to be given
Mapp v. Ohio4 and Burdeau v. McDowell.5
Plaintiff Rose Del Presto upon searching the home at which
both she and her husband resided discovered love letters and Christmas cards from her husband's alleged paramour as well as a pamphlet on birth control pills and a receipt for jewelry purchased by
the husband for the alleged paramour.6 Plaintiff further staged a
raid upon the apartment occupied by the alleged paramour accompanied by an entourage composed of her son, private investigators
and the police. 7 Both the defendant and the correspondent were in
the apartment at the time and the plaintiff took numerous photographs and made visual observations.8 Upon rendition of his opinion, Judge Consodine suppressed the evidence obtained by breaking
and entering the apartment as well as the love letters, etc., obtained by plaintiff's search of the marital residenceY
The court gave literal effect to the holding of Mapp v. Ohio:
"that all evidence obtained by searches and seizures in viola1. 92 N.J. Super. 305, 223 A.2d 217 (Chancery Div. 1966).

2. Ibid.
3. Sackler v. Sackler, 15 N.Y.2d 40, 203 N.E.2d 481 (1964). Contra,
Williams v. Williams, 8 Ohio Misc. 156, 221 N.E.2d 622 (C.P. Ohio 1966).
4. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
5. 256 U.S. 465 (1921).
6. Brief for plaintiff, second unnumbered page.
7. Brief for defendant, page 2; Brief for plaintiff, second unnumbered page.
8. Ibid.
9. Letter from Harold M. Savage to Michael R. Connor, Dec. 8, 1966,
quoting a letter from Judge Consodine. Judge Consodine said:
As to the motion of the defendant, I will suppress all evidence
secured by breaking and entering the apartment of the woman
alleged to be the friend of the defendant. I will also suppress all
evidence secured by the plaintiff without legal right from the
defendant. I refer particularly to alleged love letters, Christmas
cards, a pamphlet on pregnancy, and a receipt for jewelry. The
law applicable is applicable to both the personal property and the
raid.
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tion of the Constitution is, by that same authority, inadmissible
in a state court."'1 Plaintiff argued that Mapp only applied to governmental seizures, citing Burdeau v. McDowell.' as authority for
the proposition that the fourth amendment is not involved in nongovernmental intrusions. The New Jersey Court was influenced
by Williams v. United States12 which said that Burdeau was in
effect overruled by Elkins v. United States."
The New York case of Sackler v. Sackler 4 was disregarded because of the subsequent Supreme Court decision in One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania." There the exclusionary rules were
held applicable to a quasi-civil forfeiture action. Justice Goldberg,
speaking for the Court, was unable to justify use of illegally seized
evidence in a forfeiture proceeding which requires the showing that
the criminal law was violated, while prohibiting its use in a criminal proceeding.
Historically, all competent and relevant evidence has been freely admissible regardless of the manner in which it was obtained. 1
The judicial rules of evidence were never meant to be used
as an indirect method of punishment. To punish the incidental violation by rendering evidence obtained thereby inadmissible in the primary litigation is to enlarge improperly the fixed penalty of the law . . . by adding to it the

forfeiture of some civil right through the loss of the means
of providing it.
The incidental illegality is by no means condoned. rt
is merely ignored in this litigation."
Boyd v. United States8 introduced the concept of a constitutional exclusionary rule. There in rather limited circumstances it
was held that the fifth amendment's protection against self-incrimination rendered the admission of certain evidence erroneous and
unconstitutional. Subsequently Weeks v. United States, 9 held that
evidence illegally seized by federal authorities would be inadmissible in a federal court. Burdeauv. McDowell2' rejected an attempt to
extend this exclusionary rule to privately seized evidence despite
the intent of federal officials to use the evidence thus obtained in
criminal prosecutions. The court said that the fourth amendment
was only intended to be a restraint 21on the activities of sovereign
authority and not on private persons.
10. 376 U.S. at 655 (Emphasis added.)
11. 256 U.S. 465 (1921).
12. 282 F.2d 940 (6th Cir. 1960).
13. 364 U.S. 206 (1960).
14. 15 N.Y.2d 40, 203 N.E.2d 481 (1964).
15. 380 U.S. 693 (1965).
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

See 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2183 (McNaughton rev. 1961).
Ibid. (original emphasis).
116 U.S. 616 (1886).
232 U.S. 383 (1914).
256 U.S. 405 (1921).

21.

Id. at 475.
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Mapp v. Ohio2 2 and the cases leading up to it 23 greatly ex-

panded the exclusionary rule in criminal cases. One 1958 Plymouth
Sedan v. Pennsylvania24 extended this rule to a forfeiture case.
It is a large step, however, from a forfeiture case, having strong
criminal overtones, to a purely civil matter such as a divorce. Mr.
Justice Goldberg continually emphasized 25 the quasi-criminal nature of a forfeiture action as a justification for use of the exclusionary rule. "[A] forfeiture prbceeding is quasi-criminal in character. Its object, like a criminal proceeding,
is to penalize for the
2
commission of an offense against the law. 6
Aside from the difficulties encountered in extending the exclusionary rule from a forfeiture case to a purely civil action, Del
Presto faces yet another constitutional snag. The evidence excluded
in Del Presto was obtained by private citizens in no way acting in
a governmental capacity. It is not clear that Elkins v. United
States27 did overrule the holding of Burdeau v. McDowell2s that the
fourth amendment is inapplicable to seizure by private persons;
Elkins involved a seizure by state agents. 29 The New York Court of
Appeals concluded in Sackler v. Sackler that despite Elkins, Burdeau was still the law. 30
Judge Van Vorhis in his dissent to Sackler was of the opinion
that Mapp was controlling:
In Mapp v. Ohio . . . the Supreme Court . . . said:

'We

hold that all evidence obtained by searches and seizures in
violation of the Constitution is, by that same authority, inadmissible in a state court.' In that broad pronouncement,
no distinction is made between the admissibility of such
evidence in civil and criminal cases, nor between whether
the illegal search and seizure has been made by a public
office holder. In fact, there is no such thing as an illegal
search by a public officeholder as such, inasmuch as our
fundamental law regards him under such circumstances as
having stepped out of his role as a public official become
a trespasser.31
22. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
23. Rea v. United States, 350 U.S. 214 (1956) (evidence illegally
seized by federal officers could not be turned over to state officers for state
prosecution); Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960) (evidence of
federal crime illegally seized by state officers inadmissible in federal
courts).
24. 380 U.S. 693 (1965).
25. See, e.g., the following pages of his opinion at 380 U.S. 697, 700,
701, 702.
26. One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. at 700.
27. 364 U.S. 206 (1960).
28. 256 U.S. 465 (1921).
29. The Sixth Circuit in Williams v. United States, 282 F.2d 940 (6th
Cir. 1960), however, assumed without discussion that Elkins overruled
Burdeau.
30. Sackler v. Sackler, 15 N.Y.2d at 43, 44, 203 N.E.2d at 483 (1964).
31. Id. at 45, 203 N.E.2d at 484. See also Tracy v. Swarthout, 35 U.S.
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Despite this broad language, we are left with Burdeau, yet to be
expressly overruled, which holds the fourth amendment inapplicable to private seizures. Also, any Supreme Court application of
the exclusionary rule has occurred only in a criminal or quasicriminal context.
A commentator upon Sackler v. Sackler has suggested that any
civil exclusionary rule would be better based upon grounds of
policy rather than the constitution. 2 It was there suggested that
the exclusionary rule be based upon something akin to the equitable
doctrine of clean hands or the common law refusal to let one profit
from his own wrong.3 3 Such a rule would go far to prevent the
illegal seizure of evidence and would curtail the trade of those who
make the illegal gathering of evidence their business. While there
might be certain policy reasons which would favor the exclusion in
civil suits of evidence illegally seized by private persons, it remains
unclear that such a result is constitutionally commanded.
MICHAEL R. CONNOR

(10 Pet.) 80 (1836) (unlawful act by a public official partakes the character of a private transaction).
32. Note, 43 N.C.L. REv. 608 at 613 (1965).
33. Ibid.
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Mechanicsburg Office

Main and Market Streets, Mechanicsburg

Shiremanstown Office

2 West Main Street, Shiremanstown

the

HIarisburg National
Bank .,., Trust Conpanyf
South Market Square
(Main Office and DriveIn Windows). Uptown • Penbrook • Steelton
Highspire. Middletown - Shiremanstown Mechanicsburg
Carlisle Deposit- Carlisle Sharon New Eloomfield• Dillsburg
10.16
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